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Abstract
This article argues that ﬁat money’s only technological role in an economy is to
act as societal memory: money allows people to credibly record some aspects of
their transactions and make that record accessible to other people. This record-
keeping role is demonstrated in the three standard paradigms of ﬁat money: the
overlapping generations, turnpike, and search models. In these models, if a new
economy is created by removing the money and replacing it only with a historical
record of all transactions, known to everyone in the economy, then the original
monetary allocation is still achievable as an equilibrium.
This article is a less technical presentation of the ideas in the author’s study,
“Money is Memory,” which is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory.
The article appears in the Minneapolis Fed’s Quarterly Review with the permission
of Academic Press.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Imagine that John and Paul meet. John has apples and
wants bananas. Paul wants apples but doesn’t have banan-
as. In monetary economies, this problem is solved by Paul
giving John money in exchange for apples. John then uses
the money to buy bananas from someone else—let’s say
George. If John doesn’t give the apples to Paul, then John
doesn’t get the money and can’t buy the bananas from
George.
This scenario demonstrates that adding ﬁat money to
an economy expands the set of allocations available in the
economy. In this sense, money is a technological innova-
tion, just as much as the train or the steam engine is.
But, of course, unlike those devices, money itself is in-
trinsically useless.So,what technologicalroledoesmoney
actually play? In terms of the reallocation of intrinsically
valuable resources, we can think of the scenario above as
a situation in which John is considering making Paul a gift
of apples. If John makes the gift, George will give him ba-
nanas in the future; if John doesn’t make the gift, George
won’t give him the bananas. The money that John receives
from Paul and offers to George is merely a way to let
GeorgeknowthatJohnhasfulﬁlledhissocietalobligations
and given Paul his gift of apples.
Thus, monetary economies can be viewed as merely
large interlocking networks of gifts. If agents in the econ-
omy know the history of all gifts, then any allocation of re-
sources achievable in the economy with money is achiev-
able without it. George, for example, can react to different
histories of John’s gift-giving in the same way that he re-
acts to John having different amounts of money.
This analysis leads to a simple conclusion: If the func-
tion performed by money can be superseded by a perfect
historicalrecordoftransactions,thenmoney’sonlytechno-
logical role must be to provide that record. In other words,
money is a form of record keeping, or societal memory.
I make this argument formally by considering the three
standard paradigms of ﬁat money: the overlapping genera-
tions, turnpike, and search models. In each of these mod-
els, I create a new economy by removing the money and
replacing it only with a historical record of all transactions,
a history known to all agents. I do not provide agents with
any additional ability to enforce contracts. I show that in
each of the models the original monetary allocation is still
achievable as an equilibrium in the new environment with
perfect societal memory. I conclude that the only techno-
logical role of money is to provide a (possibly limited)
form of societal memory of transactions.
My argument demonstrates the vacuity of the three
standard explanations of the role of ﬁat money in an econ-
omy: money acts as a store of value, a medium of ex-
change, and a unit of account. From a technological point
of view, we can see that none of these functions really re-
quire money. Money does not represent a new way for so-
ciety to accumulate wealth. Money does not reduce the
costs of transferring resources from one person to another.
There is no immediate technological reason that money
should be a better numeraire than other goods. The tradi-
tional explanations for the presence of money in an econ-
omyaremoredescriptiveofitsfunctionsthanexplanatory.
The true explanation for money’s presence is that money
is a record-keeping device.
I am not the ﬁrst to notice that money has a record-
keeping role; anyone who makes an argument along these
lines has to acknowledge an enormous debt to the work of
Robert Townsend (1987,1989, 1990). Townsend hasstud-
ied several environments in which the optimal arrange-
ments feature monetary tokens that help agents remember
trading histories.
1 Other researchers [among them, Joseph
Ostroy(1973),RobertLucas(1980),andRaoAiyagariand
Neil Wallace (1991)] have noted, as I emphasize here, that
ﬁatmoneyhelpskeeptrackofpasttransactions.Incontrast
to those researchers, though, I emphasize the generality
and the singularity of money’s record-keeping role. My
pointisatwistedversionofMiltonFriedman’sfamousdic-
tum: Money is always and everywhere a mnemonic phe-
nomenon.
The Argument in General...
Again, the general line of argument runs as follows. Take
any economy in which money circulates. Remove the
money, and replace it with a history of all transactions in
the economy, a history known to all agents. At each point
in time, allow an agent to make gifts to anyone who is a
potential trading partner in the monetary economy. The
monetaryequilibriumallocationis,then,anequilibriumal-
location in the gift-giving economy, or game.
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The logic behind this argument is that with a record of
past transactions, we can construct strategies in the gift-
giving game that correspond to what happens in the mon-
etary economy. In the monetary economy, whenever an
agent gives up consumption, that agent receives a sum of
money which can be used to purchase consumption in the
next period. Analogously, in the gift-giving game, an
imaginary balance sheet is kept for each agent. When an
agent gives consumption to someone else, the giver’s bal-
ance rises, and so does that agent’s capacity for receiving
future gifts. When an agent gets consumption from some-
one else, the agent’s balance and capacity for receiving fu-
ture gifts both drop. In the monetary economy, money is
merely a physical way of maintaining this balance sheet.
Note that the gift-giving game differs from the mone-
tary economy in only two respects. One is that in the gift-
giving game, money does not exist. The other is that in the
gift-giving game, all agents know about all past transac-
tions. Thus, the gift-giving game does not introduce any
means of enforcement or contracting that don’t exist in the
monetary economy.
3 Technologically, then, money is, in-
deed, a form of societal memory.
. . . And in Three Standard Models
Now I will apply this general argument to three standard
paradigmsofﬁatmoney: anoverlappinggenerationsmod-
el, a turnpike model, and a search model.4 I will show that
money is a perfect mnemonic device in the ﬁrst two types
of model, but is severely limited in this role in the third.
Overlapping Generations Models
I begin with an overlapping generations model similar to
the one originally described by Paul Samuelson (1958). I
show that in this type of model, any monetary equilibrium
is a gift-giving equilibrium of the same economy with per-
fect memory of all transactions.
Let’s say that in this economy, each cohort includes J
agents. Agents each live two periods—in the ﬁrst, they are
young; in the second, old. Each period another generation
of two-period lived agents is born. Agents in each genera-
tion are each endowed with one unit of a perfectly divis-
ible consumption good when young and zero units of thisgood when old; the consumption good is not storable. The
young agents have preferences over current consumption
(cy) and future consumption (co) that are represented by
the utility function:
u(cy,co)
where u is strictly increasing. The old agents prefer more
consumption to less.
With Money
Suppose, ﬁrst, that the initial old agents each have one
unit of a perfectly divisible, storable, and concealable
good that gives the holder no utility; the good is intrinsi-
cally useless. I call this good money. Suppose further that
in every period, the agents trade money for consumption
in competitive markets. A competitive equilibrium in this
environment is a sequence of prices of money in terms of
consumption, {pt}
¥
t=1, such that the young agents in every
period demand the entire stock of money. Mathematically,
then, in a competitive equilibrium, it must be true that, for
all t,
1 Î argmaxm³0 u(1−ptm,pt+1m)
where m is an individual agent’s money holdings. In such
an equilibrium, in period t, the young agents consume 1 −
pt units of the consumption good while the old agents con-
sume pt units.
Without Money
Now suppose that instead of competitively exchanging
money for goods, the agents play a gift-giving game. In
particular, in period t, each of the J young agents simulta-
neously transfers some nonnegative amount of consump-
tion to each old agent. Denote the transfer made by young
agent j to old agent i in period t by t
j
t
i. Deﬁne a history in










A strategy for young agent j in period t + 1 is a map-
ping from the set of possible histories to the set of feasible
transfer vectors. A gift-giving equilibrium is a collection
of strategies for which the action prescribed by each strat-
egy after any history of play is an optimal response, and
the actions prescribed by the other strategies are taken as
given.
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Note that in a gift-giving equilibrium, agents have no
way to commit to a particular transfer scheme over time.
Hence,thecrucial differencebetweenthegift-giving game
and the monetary economy is that in the former, agents are
endowed with knowledge of all past transactions.
Thefollowingpropositiondemonstratesthatinthistype
of model, monetary equilibria are merely special instances
of outcomes in the gift-giving game:
PROPOSITION1. In an overlapping generations model, the
transfers in any stationary monetary equilibrium are an
equilibrium path of transfers in a gift-giving game.
Proof. Consider a monetary equilibrium {pt}
¥
t=1. Without
loss of generality, number the agents so that in a monetary
equilibrium, young agent j makes a transfer pt to old agent
j in period t. The claim is that this sequence of transfers
can be supported as a gift-giving equilibrium.
In period 0, all of the currently old agents are labeled G.
(Think of the labels G and B as abbreviations for good and
bad. Agents labeled G have never failed to make the gifts
mandated by the implicit social contract in a gift-giving
equilibrium; agents labeled B have broken the social con-
tract.)
Consider the following strategies for young agent j in
period t:
• If the currently old agent j is labeled B, then the
young agent makes no transfer to that old agent.
• If the currently old agent j is labeled G, then the
young agent does make a transfer pt to that agent;
failure to do so will cause the young agent to be la-
beled B next period.
Note that these are legitimate strategies, because the labels
are functions of only the histories of play and the initial
labels.
I claim that this collection of strategies is a gift-giving
equilibrium. Suppose the old agent j is labeled B. Then the
young agent has no incentive to make a transfer to the old
agent, and so does not. If the old agent is labeled G, then
if the young agent doesn’t make a transfer pt today, next
periodthecurrentlyyoungagentwillnotreceiveatransfer.
But we know that
u(1,0) £ u(1−pt,pt+1)
because in the monetary equilibrium, the agent chose to
give up pt units of consumption today in exchange for pt+1
units of consumption next period. Hence, in this situation,
the young agent will make a transfer to the old agent.
Q.E.D.
In an overlapping generations model, then, removing
money from the economy and replacing it with a histori-
cal record does not eliminate any equilibrium allocations.
Therefore, in this type of model, money is merely a par-
ticular type of mnemonic device. Indeed, here money is a
good mnemonic device; monetary equilibrium allocations
(in which the price level is constant) exist which are effi-
cient among the class of all gift-giving equilibrium alloca-
tions. Society can do no better with alternative record-
keeping devices than it can with money.
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Turnpike Models
A defect with the overlapping generations economy is that
the period of decision making (half of a lifetime) seems
quite different from the frequency with which people ac-
tually make decisions about money holdings. Here I con-
sider a similar model due to Townsend (1980) which does
not suffer from that weakness. In it, I prove a proposition
similar to the one above.
With Money
Consider a world with an inﬁnite number of trading posts
located at the integer points along the real number line.
Think of them as situated along a highway, or turnpike.
In each period, at each trading post, there are two types
of agents. In period t, the odd agents are each endowed
with one unit of consumption if t is odd and zero units of
consumptioniftiseven;theevenagentsareeachendowed
with zero units of consumption if t is odd and one unit of
consumptioniftiseven.Consumptionisperishable.Inpe-riod t, each type of agent has preferences over current and




with a discount factor 0 < b < 1, where u is strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave, and bounded from above and below.
Even agents are endowed with one unit of money each
in period 1. (Here, as above, money is an intrinsically use-
less, perfectly divisible, storable, and concealable good.)
Next period, the odd agents move one trading post to the
left,andtheevenagentsmoveonetradingpost totheright.
In each period, the agents at a given trading post trade con-
sumption and money competitively among themselves.
Thisenvironmenthasastationarymonetaryequilibrium
if and only if there exists a d
* > 0 such that
d
* = argmaxd u(1−d)+b u ( d ).
In this type of an equilibrium, the rich agents (those with
the larger endowment) in any period give away d units of
consumption in exchange for the money held by the poor
agents.
Without Money
Now suppose that there is no money in the turnpike econ-
omy.Instead,agentsplayagift-givinggameofthesortdis-
cussed for the overlapping generations economy. In each
period, every agent is free to transfer any amount of con-
sumption to any other agent at the same trading post; the
agentsdecideonthetransferssimultaneously.Inthisgame,
as in the overlapping generations model, a history is a full
record of all transfers made in the past, and a gift-giving
equilibrium is a collection of strategies that prescribe opti-
mal actions for every agent after every history, with other
agents’ strategies taken as given.
We canprove aversion ofProposition1in thisenviron-
ment:
PROPOSITION 2. In a turnpike model, the transfers in any
stationary monetary equilibrium are an equilibrium path
of transfers in a gift-giving game.
Proof. Let d
* be the time-invariant transfer made in a sta-
tionary monetary equilibrium. According to the model,
there are groups of J agents who are always together. In-
dex each agent in a group from 1 to J. (In effect, name
them.) Every agent can be labeled G or B (again, good or
bad); initially, all agents are labeled G. Then consider the
followingstrategyforacurrentlyrichagent jinaparticular
group (that is, an agent j who has received a high endow-
ment):
• If either the currently rich agent jor the currently poor
agent j is labeled B, then the rich agent does nothing.
• If the rich agent is labeled G, and t is an even number,
then the agent does nothing.
• If the rich agent is labeled G, t is an odd number, and
the poor agent is also labeled G, then the rich agent
gives d
* to the poor agent. Failure to give less than d
*
results in the rich agent being labeled B in the future.
Note that here, as in the proof of Proposition 1, the labels
are functions of only the histories of play and the initial
labels, so that these are legitimate strategies.
This collection of strategies is a gift-giving equilibrium.
In particular, if a rich agent doesn’t make a transfer when
the strategies require one, then that agent is labeled B. This
means the agent is forced into autarky, because an agent
labeled B never receives any gifts. This is worse than stay-
ing with the pattern of transfers promised by the monetary
equilibrium, because
u(1−d
*)+b u ( d
*)³u (1) + bu(0). Q.E.D.
Again, removing money from the turnpike economy and
replacing it with complete memory does not eliminate the
monetary equilibrium; money is merely a special type of
memory.
In the overlapping generations setting, the monetary
equilibrium delivered an allocation that was efficient
among the set of all gift-giving equilibrium paths. Gener-
ally, this will not be true in the turnpike model. We can
easily show that in this model a time-invariant transfer d
*
can only be an efficient gift-giving equilibrium path if
either d
* = 1/2 or the rich agent is pushed to the agent’s
autarkic level of utility:
u(1−d
*)+{ b [ u ( d
*)+u (1−d
*)]/(1−b)}
= u( 1 )+{ b [ u (0) + u(1)]/(1−b)}.
(Intuitively, we know that if d
* ¹ 1/2, then the rich agent
needs to be pushed to an autarkic level of utility in order to
generate as much consumption-smoothing as possible.) In
general, neither of these conditions is met in a stationary
monetary equilibrium.
This analysis suggests that money is an imperfect mne-
monic device in the turnpike model. But, as Leonid Hur-
wicz(1980)emphasizes,wemustbecarefulaboutattribut-
ing defects of particular trading arrangements to money. In
this context, the failure to allocate resources efficiently is




We can see this by changing the exchange procedure as
follows. Suppose that within every cohort and at every
trading post, agents are numbered from 1 to J. Agents with
the same number are paired. In each pair, the two agents
simultaneously and separately write down a proposed ex-
change. If the two proposals match, then the exchange oc-
curs. The agents don’t know each other’s trading histories,
but they can observe money holdings.
In an economy with this exchange procedure, any gift-
giving equilibrium path is also an equilibrium with money
but no memory. Suppose, for example, that the (1/2,1/2)
split is a gift-giving equilibrium path. We can easily de-
scribe strategies in the economy with money that support
this split. If the poor agent has at least one unit of money,
then the rich agent proposes to give up half a unit of con-
sumption in exchange for that unit of money. The poor
agent writes down this same proposal always. If the poor
agent has less than one unit of money, then the rich agent
refuses to make any transfer.
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These strategies form an equilibrium as long as the rich
agent is willing to give up half a unit of consumption to-
day in order to gain the beneﬁts of consumption-smooth-ing in the future. Put another way, these strategies support
the (1/2,1/2) split as long as it delivers more utility than au-
tarky in every period. This is true if and only if the strate-
gies also form a gift-giving equilibrium.
The key to this exchange procedure is that the valuation
of money in terms of consumption is highly nonlinear: one
unit of money is worth half a unit of consumption, while
any amount of money less than one unit is worth zero. The
assumption that exchange at each trading post enforces a
linear pricing rule is what leads to suboptimal allocations.
(For a similar argument, see Townsend 1989.)
To sum up: In a turnpike model, all stationary mone-
tary equilibria are also gift-giving equilibria. The station-
ary monetary equilibria are inefficient compared to other
gift-giving equilibria, but only because of the assumption
of competitive exchange. An exchange procedure does ex-
ist in which using money involves no loss of memory.
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Search Models
Neither the overlapping generations model nor the turn-
pike model captures one of the traditional reasons people
are thought to hold ﬁat money: to overcome an absence of
a double coincidence of wants. For example, a butcher has
beef to sell and wants to buy bread. Without money, the
butcher has to search for a baker who isn’t a vegetarian
and who happens to want beef now. The time it takes the
butcher to ﬁnd such a baker can be a big problem since
beef is perishable. The existence of money changes every-
thing. The butcher can now sell beef to anyone who wants
it in exchange for money and then use the money to buy
bread from any baker who comes along.
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randall Wright (1991) present
a model that does capture this role for money. Here I show
that in their search model, unlike in the other two models,
money is only a limited form of societal memory. This
leaves open the possibility that economies need other rec-
ord-keepingdevicesaswell—which,ofcourse,iswhatac-
tual economies have.
The Kiyotaki-Wright model works as follows. The
economy has three types of agents, all of whom differ in
their preferences and their technologies; three is the mini-
mal number of types necessary to generate an absence of
a double coincidence of wants. (For example, think of the
types as butchers who like to eat bread, bakers who like
to eat potatoes, and potato farmers who like to eat beef.)
The economy has a continuum of each type of agent. The
economy also has three types of nondurable and indivisi-
ble goods. In each period, a type i agent is endowed with
one unit of good i. However, type i agents receive one
unit of utility in a given period only from consumption of
good i +1 .
9These agents receive no units of utility from
consuming any other good. The agents live forever and
discount utility using the discount factor b.
Each period, agents are matched randomly in pairs; any
particular agent is equally likely to be matched with any of
the three types of agents. Matched agents can make trades
or transfers of goods as they see ﬁt. However, to make any
trade or transfer, an agent must give up < 1 units of util-
ity (say, in transportation costs).
In this environment, it is efficient ex ante for type i +1
agents to give their consumption good to type i agents
whenever they are paired: the units of utility lost when
an agent is a giver is made up by the one unit gained from
theconsumptiongood.Theproblemwiththisarrangement
is enforcement: how should a society induce the type i +
1 agents to endure the -unit cost of transferring resources
to the type i agents when they are matched?
With Money
Kiyotaki and Wright (1991) demonstrate that ﬁat money
provides a partial solution to this problem. Suppose that
half the agents of each type are endowed with one unit of
an indivisible, storable, and concealable good called ﬁat
money. Assume that consumption of this ﬁat money pro-
vides no utility to any of the agents. Assume as well that
the agents cannot hold more than one unit of money at one
time. In a stationary monetary equilibrium, type i agents
with money give their money, in exchange for goods, to
type i + 1 agents, who have no money. The type i +1
agents accept the intrinsically useless money because they
can use it to acquire their desired consumption goods from
half of the type i + 2 agents in the future.
Clearly, a stationary monetary equilibrium exists only
if agents are sufficiently patient: they must be willing to
pay the transportation cost today in exchange for the
possibility of getting desirable goods in the future. Let’s
see what is required for a stationary monetary equilibrium.
Deﬁne the lifetime utility of agents to be V1 for those
with money and V0 for those without money. Then, in a
stationary monetary equilibrium, the values V1 and V0
should satisfy these equations:
V1 = [(1 + bV0)/6] + (5bV1/6)
V0 = [(− + bV1)/6] + (5bV0/6).
The V1 equation says that agents with money will, with
probability 5/6, keep their money and get zero utility today
and, with probability 1/6, meet someone with a desirable
good but no money and make a trade. The V0 equation
says that agents without money will, with probability 5/6,
meet no one who wants to trade with them and, with prob-
ability 1/6, meet someone with money who wants their
good.
The values V1 and V0 must also satisfy these two in-
equalities:
−+ b V 1 ³b V 0
1+b V 0³b V 1.
These guarantee that agents without money ﬁnd it best to
exchange their good for money while those with money
ﬁnd it best to exchange the money for a good. Such a V1
and a V0 exist if and only if
b³6 /(1+5 ).
Thus, if individuals are sufficiently patient (b is high) or if
transportation costs are sufficiently low ( is low), ﬁat
money provides a partial solution to the problem of how to
induce agents with desirable goods to give those goods to
their current trading partners.
Without Money
Here, as in the other models, ﬁat money is only necessary
if agents do not know the economy’s full history of trans-
actions. To see this, consider the following gift-giving
game.Upon being paired, each agent chooses, simultaneously
and separately, to either transfer a good to the other agent
or not. A history in this game is a full record of an agent’s
past actions, the past actions of all previous partners, the
past actions of those agents’ past partners, and so on. As
before, a strategy is simply a mapping from histories into
choices.Inagift-givingequilibrium,thestrategyprescribes
an action after any history that is optimal, taking as given
the other agents’ strategies.
Having deﬁned equilibrium in this way, we can prove
the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3. In a search model, the transfers in any
stationary monetary equilibrium are an equilibrium path
of transfers in a gift-giving game.
Proof.Thestationarymonetaryequilibriumisanasymmet-
ricgift-givingequilibrium.Labeltheagentswhooriginally
have money G (good), and label those without money B
(bad). Describe a strategy in the transfer game as follows:
• In any period, if a type i + 1 agent labeled B meets a
type i agent labeled G, then the type i + 1 agent gives
her or his good to the type i agent. The agents’ labels
are then exchanged.
• There is no transfer in any other meeting.
Note that the labels G and B are functions of the history of
all transactions in the economy, so that the above are legit-
imate strategies. Also, note that the utility associated with
being labeled G equals V1 and the utility associated with
being labeled B equals V0.
Is this collection of strategies a gift-giving equilibrium?
Note ﬁrst that being labeled G is better than being labeled
B. Consider a type i agent who is currently labeled G. This
agent will not give up a good to a type i − 1 agent; the
type i agent sees no future compensation for the current
loss of utility associated with giving up the good. (The
agent already has the best possible label G.) Consider, in-
stead, a type i agent who is currently labeled B. In the sta-
tionary monetary equilibrium, bV0 £ −+ b V 1 . Therefore,
such an agent is willing to pay today and give up a good
in exchange for receiving the better label in the future.
Q.E.D.
Thus, here, as in the previous two model economies,
money is serving only as a means of keeping track of what
has happened in the past. If agents can keep track on their
own, then money becomes superﬂuous (in the sense that
adding money to the economy does not help attain any
Pareto superior allocations).
In the overlapping generations and turnpike contexts,
we saw that the presence of a perfectly divisible, storable,
andconcealablegoodissufficienttoreplaceallknowledge
of the historical record. This is not true in the search mod-
el: typically, this model has a gift-giving equilibrium that
implements a more efficient allocation than that obtained
in the stationary monetary equilibrium.
Toseethis,notethattheworstpossiblegift-givingequi-
librium in this environment is the equilibrium without
trade. (It provides zero utility.) This can be used as a threat
to support better outcomes. Hence, as long as
− (1−b)+[ b (1− )/3] ³ 0
an agent will be sufficiently deterred by the prospect of no
future trade to give up a consumption good today to some-
one who wants it. We can rewrite this restriction as
b³3 /(1+2 ).
Clearly,
3 /(1+2 ) < 6 /(1+5 ).
Thus, whenever a stationary monetary equilibrium exists,
a gift-giving equilibrium implements the symmetric effi-
cient allocation.
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This setting has an intrinsic limitation on money as a
mnemonicdevice,alimitationthathelpstogeneratethein-
efficiency of the monetary equilibria. In the efficient gift-
giving equilibrium, type i agents who fail to make a trans-
fer to type i +1 agents are punished severely. Type i agents
who fail to make a transfer to type i agents are not pun-
ished at all. This distinction is crucial because the ﬁrst
transfer type is socially beneﬁcial (ex ante) while the sec-
ond is not.
In a monetary economy without a historical record, this
distinction is impossible. Because no record is kept of the
past trading partners of particular agents, those who fail to
make a transfer because they are poorly matched must be
treated the same by future agents as those who fail to make
a transfer because they are defecting from the optimal so-
cial arrangement. Money only induces transfers by prom-
ising future beneﬁts to those who make them. Therefore,
in any equilibrium, a type i agent is better off meeting a
type i + 1 agent than meeting another type i agent. This
ﬂuctuation in utility along the equilibrium path is subopti-
malrelativetowhatoccursintheefficientgift-givingequi-
librium.
The imperfections of money as a mnemonic device in
search models do not undercut my general argument that
money is a mnemonic device. Rather, the search model al-
lows us to contemplate the quite realistic possibility that
there are other mnemonic devices that are as good as or
perhaps better than money. In the search model, alternate
record-keeping technologies such as electronic debit cards
and transaction records might well offer a welfare im-
provement over money; they do not in the overlapping
generations and turnpike models.
The Role of Bonds?
So, money is merely a way to keep track of promises of
future beneﬁts in exchange for past gifts. Can we think of
all paper assets in this way? A bond, for example, is an in-
trinsically useless piece of paper that promises the holder
consumption in the future for having given up consump-
tion in the past. Do the above propositions also apply to
bonds?No.Assetmarketequilibriacannotgenerallybeob-
tained as gift-giving equilibria.
Here is a trivial example of that fact. In any ﬁnite-hori-
zon setting, there is only one gift-giving equilibrium: au-
tarky. (Similarly, autarky is the only monetary equilibri-
um.) Yet, ﬁnite-horizon settings may well have nonautar-
kic asset market allocations. The phenomenon is less ob-
vious in inﬁnite-horizon settings, but is nonetheless still
true: those settingshave asset market equilibriathat are not
gift-giving equilibria.
Bondsareabletoachieveadditionalallocationsbecause
bonds are used in settings in which agents can be forced toviolate ex post individual rationality constraints. In a two-
period setting, that is, a rational borrower has an incentive
to default on a loan in the second period. Some threat of
external force is necessary to make the borrower abide by
thetermsofthecontract.Thisthreatofexternalforceisnot
present in gift-giving games.
In sum: Both money and bonds are intrinsically useless
pieces of paper that help keep track of past transactions.
The distinction between the two is contextual. Money
serves as a type of memory in environments or relation-
shipswithoutenforcementorcommitment.(Sowhenmon-
eyisinvolved,alltransfersofresourcescanlegitimatelybe
described as gifts.) Bonds serve as a type of memory in en-
vironments or relationships with enforcement or commit-
ment. (Some transfers of resources occur because of the
threat of external force.)
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Conclusion
Money’s technological role in an economy is to allow peo-
ple to credibly record some aspects of their past transac-
tions and make that record accessible to other people. In
short, money acts as societal memory. The ability of mon-
ey to perform this role depends on speciﬁcs of the envi-
ronment:Money isa perfectmemory devicein someover-
lapping generations and turnpike models, but is of only
limited use in some search models. The main difference
between the roles of money and bonds has to do with the
type of environment or relationship involved. Both money
and bonds are used as record-keeping devices, but with
bonds, commitment to abide by the terms of the contract
is possible, and with money, it is not.
In his work, Townsend (1980 especially) emphasizes
the importance of spatial arrangements in determining the
relative use of currency and credit. According to my rea-
soning here, the crucial attribute of a particular spatial ar-
rangement is not the geography itself, but rather the tech-
nological limitations to memory and commitment that the
geography suggests. Thus, in the turnpike model, it seems
natural for even and odd agents who meet at a trading post
to be unaware of each other’s pasts; this lack of memory
generatesaneedformoney.Nonetheless,thelackofmem-
ory is not intrinsic to the geographical speciﬁcation, but
rather reﬂects a particular technological deﬁciency.
Similarly, in the turnpike model, it seems unnatural for
an odd agent j to give up consumption today for a piece of
paper that reads “Agent j in the even cohort at the next
trading post to the left owes the bearer one unit of con-
sumption.” The absence of such contracts is what makes
money valued. Again, however, nothing intrinsic in the
geography rules out such contracts; rather, the absence of
such contracts reﬂects the absence of a particular type of
enforcement technology.
Asmyanalysisofthesearchmodelmakesclear,money
is, in general, only a limited form of memory. This sug-
gests at least two challenges for future research. One is to
ﬁnd a more precise qualiﬁer than limited to describe mon-
ey’s record-keeping function. We must remember, though,
that any such qualiﬁers are uninteresting unless they apply
to a wide class of economic environments.
The other challenge for researchers is essentially that
posed by Hurwicz (1980). He argues that we might want
to think of money as being an efficient way to solve some
type of problem in institutional design. With my analysis,
we can tighten Hurwicz’s point a bit. Societies have access
to a wide variety of record-keeping technologies. Why is
money, with all of its mnemonic limitations, such a wide-
spread institution? My recent work with Wallace (Koch-
erlakotaandWallace1997)isaﬁrststeptoward answering
that question.
Finally, a word about the real-world implications of this
viewofmoney.Monetaryeconomicshastraditionallybeen
dominated by the question of how the quantity of money,
or the growth rate of that quantity, affects prices and quan-
tities of goods. My reasoning here suggests that this focus
is misplaced. Money is a record-keeping device; hence,
monetarypolicyshouldbedesignedsothatrecord-keeping
is performed in the most efficient way possible. How do
we do that? Currently, we do not know. But searching for
the answers should lead to a more satisfactory (and robust)
understanding of optimal monetary policy.
*This article is a less technical presentation of the ideas in the author’s article,
“MoneyisMemory,”whichisforthcominginthe JournalofEconomicTheory©1998.
The article appearshere withthe permissionof AcademicPress. Theauthor thanksRao
Aiyagari,V.V.Chari,DeanCorbae,EdGreen,LarryJones,NedPrescott,NeilWallace,
RuilinZhou, andespeciallyBarbaraMcCutcheonforhelpfulconversations.Theauthor
also thanks Kathy Rolfe for excellent editorial assistance.
1Townsend (1987) terms money a communication technology because it lets in-
dividualscrediblycommunicateaspectsoftheirtradingandproductionhistoriestoother
agents. Iprefer themorespeciﬁc term societalmemory, butwe arereferringto thesame
function.Themostprecisetermisprobablypublicaccessdatabase:moneyisessentially
an informational storage device that allows all individuals access to records of certain




income or productivity or preference type) that is independently and identically dis-
tributed over time. However, as Ed Green and Ned Prescott have emphasized to me, in
thepresenceofprivateinformationaboutﬁxedattributes,somemonetaryequilibriamay
not be achievable as gift-giving equilibria when agents know the full history of trades.
For example, suppose I have a genetic predisposition to heart disease, and my
trading partner is a health insurance provider. If my partner knows my full history of
medical purchases, it might be able to infer that I have this genetic predisposition and
be unwilling to provide insurance. From an ex ante point of view, this failure to provide
insurance is suboptimal. Money holdings, in contrast, typically cannot convey enough
information to destroy insurance possibilities.
3I assume that monetary economies have no external enforcement of societal al-
locations of resources (technically, that agents have to satisfy sequential, individual ra-
tionality constraints). I have two reasons for making this assumption. In the environ-
mentsIstudy,theexistenceofthisexternalenforcementwouldimplythatneithermoney
nor memory allows society to obtain any Pareto improvements in the allocations of re-
sources. [For elaboration, see the work of Mark Huggett and Stefan Krasa (1996) and
my forthcoming article in the Journal of Economic Theory, on which this Quarterly
Review article is based.] The other reason for my assumption is that when intrinsically
useless tokens are used for record-keeping purposes in environments with external en-
forcement, those tokens resemble bonds rather than money. I will discuss that situation
in the last section.
4Formorecompletedescriptionsoftheoverlappinggenerationsandturnpikemod-
els, see Thomas Sargent’s 1987 textbook.
5IamdescribingherewhatisformallytermedaperfectpublicequilibriumbyDrew
Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1991, pp. 187ff). See also my forthcoming article in the
Journal of Economic Theory.
6Considerthefollowingallocationcoordinationmechanismintheoverlappinggen-
erations economy with money. Old agent j writes down a division of money and con-
sumptionbetweenoldagent jandyoungagent j;simultaneously,youngagentjdoesthe
same. If they write down the same allocation, then that division of money and con-
sumption is implemented; otherwise, it is not. We can easily show, then, that any gift-
giving equilibrium in the overlapping generations economy with societal memory is a
monetary equilibrium of this allocation coordination mechanism (even if money is in-
divisible and concealable).
7In this description of equilibrium behavior, I treat money holdings as if they are
perfectlyobservable.However,thestrategiesstillformanequilibriumifmoneyholdings
are concealable.
8What kinds of auxiliary frictions are needed to make competition a good way to
allocate resources in this environment? And when the environment has those auxiliary
frictions, is money a perfect or imperfect mnemonic device? These are good questions,
but answering them is beyond my scope here.
9In my discussion of search models, all types are understood to be modulo 3.
10It can also be shown that the utilities in the symmetric efficient allocation are
larger than V1, so agents both with and without money are worse off in the stationary
monetary equilibrium.
11According to this view, checking accounts are a form of bonds, not money.References
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